Edward Harcourt (Oxford)

Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein on Reference and Names

In Philosophical Investigations §1, Wittgenstein appears to attack a view of language according to which all words are the names of objects. But whose theory was this? It has sometimes been argued that the targets of Wittgenstein’s attack were Frege and Russell. The lecture explains why this cannot be right: in the context of assumptions which Frege, Russell and the early Wittgenstein all shared, all meaningful expressions had to be names, and (according to the Tractatus arguments which Wittgenstein rehearses in the Investigations) Frege and Russell were wrong for failing to see this. The lecture will then explore how, if those earlier assumptions are dropped, Wittgenstein’s Investigations position is closer to that of some contemporary theorists of reference than has sometimes been thought.

Link zum Vortrag: https://webconference.uibk.ac.at/b/chr-32e-dhy-4wt

Der Vortrag findet als Teil der 202006 VO Philosophiegeschichte I statt.

Professor Edward Harcourt (Oxford) ist von März bis Juni 2021 als LFUI – Wittgenstein Guest Professor Gast am Institut.