Gastvortrag von Maria Venieri (Universität Kreta): „Religious Beliefs and Hinge Commitments in Wittgenstein's Later Work“
Seminarraum VI der Katholisch-Theologische Fakultät, Karl-Rahner-Platz 3, 1. OG
In recent years, Wittgenstein’s views on religious beliefs are investigated in the light of the notion of hinge propositions or hinge commitments, introduced in his last work On Certainty. Hinge commitments, which are mostly derived from G.E. Moore’s common sense propositions, lay the basis of our form of life and our world-picture and cannot be rationally grounded. In this talk, I shall examine some main features of religious beliefs according to Wittgenstein and I shall attempt to trace similarities with hinge commitments. I will argue that some religious beliefs form the foundation of a religious form of life and in this sense they can be compared to hinge commitments. Just like hinge commitments, these basic religious beliefs cannot be rationally grounded, are not subject to doubt and are themselves the basis for further beliefs, the difference being that the certainty of religious beliefs is founded on faith. Some other differences can be found, such as the fact that hinge commitments are usually formed in early childhood, while a religious conversion can happen later in life. I will conclude that basic religious beliefs are hinges that serve as a ground and give meaning to the form of life of the religious believer.
Maria Venieri studied philosophy at the University of Athens and received her Ph.D. from LMU Munich. She is professor at the Department of Philosophy, University of Crete. Her research interests lie in philosophy of mind and language, Wittgenstein, philosophy of perception, epistemology, and philosophy of religion. Recent publications include "Solipsism and Realism in the Tractatus" (ed. by Pichler, Heinrich-Ramharter & Stadler) and (in Greek) "The Problem of Theodicy. A Wittgensteinian Approach" (ed. by Zoumboulakis).