Seminarraum VI der Katholisch-Theologische Fakultät, Karl-Rahner-Platz 3, 1. OG
Abstract zum Vortrag
I begin with a discussion of widespread reaction to several provocative and morally salient events to develop the argument that our ordinary, tutored moral thinking is deeply instructive regarding how we should conceive of the nature of morality. Mine is a “bottom-up” approach to metaethics: common sense morality, centered as it is on first-order moral matters, is committed to moral realism. It is, therefore, cognitivist, anti-skeptical, and objectivist. Why, then, moral objectivity? Because (i) common sense morality, which structures or lives in sundry ways, is committed to it; because (ii) moral realism, which is committed to objectivism, is the most philosophically cogent conception of morality; and because (iii) a proper understanding of moral properties—the subject of my second presentation at this workshop—entails moral objectivity.
Biografie
Christopher B. Kulp is Professor of Philosophy at Santa Clara University. His areas of philosophical research are epistemology, metaethics, and moral epistemology. Recent publications inlcude Non-Naturalist Moral Realism: A Metaphysical and Epistemological Defense (in progress), Varieties of Moral Knowledge (forthcoming), Metaphysics of Morality (2019), and Knowing Moral Truth: A Theory of Metaethics and Moral Knowledge (2017).